21 February 2006Issam Aburaiya
The landslide victory of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas) in the legislative elections in January 2006 undoubtedly constitutes a "political earthquake" in Palestinian and Arab politics. It's ramifications and aftershocks will continue to reverberate for a long time in Palestine/Israel, the Arab World, and beyond. Much ink has been been spilt to try to explain the causes behind such a dramatic development. Almost all explanations presented so far, however, share one common denominator: Hamas' dramatic victory is a protest vote.
There is no doubt that the vote for Hamas includes a strong component of protest against the deep corruption and ineffectiveness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its "ruling party" -- Fath. Palestinians encountered this corruption on a daily basis. They saw how large portions of international financial assistance found its way into the pockets of the PA's leaders and their cronies. They saw how, as one Palestinian put it, 'the blood of the shuhada was converted into fat bank accounts and Mercedeses." They saw how the revolutionary of yesterday became the entrepreneur of today. They also witnessed how PA economic monopolies were making profits for a small section of Palestinians at the expense of the majority. These were the "fruits of the peace process," and a vote for Hamas constitutes a strong vote against such practices. The size of Hamas' electoral victory is, thus, proportional to the size of the gap that developed between the slogans of the PA and Fath (of independence and prosperity) and the daily hardships experienced by Palestinians as a result of Oslo: high unemployment and poverty, Israeli brutality, increasing colonization, massive curtailment of freedom of movement, and a series of walls cutting Palestinians from their communities, lands, schools, and hospitals.
It would, however, be a mistake to attribute the stunning victory of Hamas only to a protest against the PA and Fath. Hamas, like other radical Islamic movements, did have something of its own to offer the Palestinians. Its moralistic discourse, religious beliefs, and calls for liberation, freedom, and justice in the name of Islam have resonated among large segments of the Palestinian population. Indeed, Hamas' mass appeal is derived from its effective co-optation of the Palestinian national project. This co-optation is manifested in the fact that Hamas has adopted the core idea of original Palestinian nationalism: Palestine from the "River to the Sea," i.e. the lost homeland can only be liberated by armed struggle. However, this adaptation does not represent a passive co-option but rather an "active and creative" one. Hamas has sanctified and Islamized Palestinian nationalism. This is clearly manifested by its elevation of Palestine to the status of Waqf (an "inalienable religious endowment"). The 1988 Charter of Hamas asserts that "the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day." The Charter goes on to explain what this means:
"It [Palestine], or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. . . This being so, who could claim to have the right to represent Muslim generations till Judgment Day?"
Furthermore, "abusing any part of Palestine," as article 13 of the Charter maintains, "is abuse directed against part of our religion." Which means that Hamas has elevated loyalty to historic Palestine to become part of the Islamic creed. Guarding and defending Palestine becomes a religious duty. This Islamization of Palestinian nationalsim proved to be popular, especially among the conservative elements in Palestinian society.
What adds to Hamas' popularity in the Palestinian community is not only that it sanctified the land of Palestine but has also sanctified the struggle for its liberation. This struggle is depicted as jihad, i.e. an individual religious-Islamic duty (fard a'yen) beholden on every Muslim until Judgment Day. "In the face of the Jews' usurpation of Palestine," the Charter of the Movement asserts, "it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised." Depicting the struggle to liberate Palestine as a part of jihad enables Hamas to reconcile the Palestinian national struggle with its universal Pan-Islamic ideals. Its attacks against Israeli targets magnified its image in the West bank and Gaza Strip as "arch resister" and enhanced its national credentials in the Palestinian community. In brief, Hamas' synthesis of religion and nationalism, or Islamic piety and fighting the occupation, converted it into a leading socio-political force in West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In contrast to many commentators who argue that the latest Hamas victory signifies the victory of Islam over nationalism, one can argue that it actually signifies the strength and potency of national themes and symbols in Palestinian politics. This point becomes clear if one remembers that the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- the parent movement of Hamas -- became a central political force in Palestinian society only with its participation in the first intifada which erupted in December 1987. Until then, the Brotherhood did not participate actively in the national struggle against Israeli colonization. It focused its energies on reforming Palestinian society and trying to stop the 'destructive imported' ideas propagated by secular forces especially those who identified with the Left. This included attacks on social behaviors that were conceived to be offensive to Islam, such as alcohol drinking, mixing the sexes, and 'immodest' dress. Struggle against Israeli occupation was not on their agenda.This explains why the Israeli authorities tacitly assisted the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s in the West Bank and Gaza. These political priorities were derived form the Muslim Brotherhood's longstanding outlook that 'Islamization from below' is a precondition for any serious confrontation with the Israeli occupation. In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that before fighting the Israeli occupation both the Muslim individual and the Muslim family should be refomed. For secular nationalists, this position was tantamount to indirect collaboration with the occupation. The Muslim Brotherhood's lack of national credentials thus prevented it from developing into a popular mass movement within the Palestinian community.
However, two important and interrelated developments in the 1980s pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to give up its 'Islamization-from-below' strategy and join the first Palestinian intifada. Firstly, the establishment of Islamic Jihad in 1981. This organization represented a more radical version of Islam and advocated immediate armed struggle against Israeli occupation. Its members carried out what were seen as the most daring attacks against Israeli targets.This, on the one hand, amplified its legitimacy among large segments of Palestinian society (including nationalists and secularists), and, on the other hand, embarrassed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Secondly, the establishment of Islamic Jihad and its attitude toward the Israeli occupation increased the fissures between two camps within the Muslim Brotherhood -- the traditional leadership which advocated 'Islamization from below' and a younger, activist, and more radical camp which advocated 'top-down Islamization.' In other words, the latter camp accepted the position of the Islamic Jihad that fighting the occupation and Islamizing society do not and should not contradict each other. Both missions can and should be carried out at the same time. The founding of Hamas shortly after the eruption of the first Palestinian intifada and its strong participation in it constitutes a victory for the second camp and its outlook. What this means is that only after joining the national Palestinian struggle did Hamas attain its mass base and popular following.
Another factor explaining the dramatic electoral success of Hamas is the extensive organizational infrastructure that it created in the West bank and Gaza. This includes mosques, religious schools, cultural centers, charity associations, and medical clinics. These organizations enabled Hamas to engage with Palestinian society and provide real answers to the concrete needs of ordinary people. Such responses stretch from sponsoring orphans and dealing with family tensions to the provision of education, health, and welfare services. Hamas civil organizations fall within a much wider grassroots model or mode of action that is characterized by mass politics, informal social networks, low organizational hierarchy, and a 'flexible' leadership structure. These characteristics granted Hamas an advantage over other movements and parties in terms of socialization, political indoctrination, and continued contact with supporters. Indeed, most of Hamas' candidates for the municipal and legislative elections have tended to be highly educated, well known in their community, and perceived as modest and committed.
In brief, Hamas' electoral success and mass popularity is not derived only from the failure of the PLO to realize the national rights of the Palestinian people. Its success is also fundamentally related to its ability to combine Islam with Palestinian nationalism, and present the synthesis as the best means of achieving Palestinian national goals: national liberation and social justice. It is yet to be seen whether Hamas will be able stand up to these crucial challenges. Or, whether it will take the easy way out, exploit its newly earned political capital, and focus its energies on imposing a conservative/reactionary social agenda on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Only time will tell.
Issam Aburaiya is Assistant Professor in the Department of Religious Studies, Seton Hall University, New Jersey.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=107&ItemID=9775
