Richard HolbrookeThursday August 29, 2002
The road to Baghdad runs through the United Nations security council. This simple truth must be recognised by the Bush administration if it wants the international support that is essential for success in Iraq. To build such support, a new security council resolution is necessary, one that authorises the use of force if Saddam Hussein refuses to allow an airtight weapons inspection regime - no-notice inspections anywhere, anytime. Such a resolution would provide those nations (Turkey, Britain) that want to support an effort to remove Saddam a vital legitimising cover for action, and put great pressure on those (Germany, France, Saudi Arabia) that are wavering or opposed.
Few Americans today understand the enormous force, both moral and political, that a security council resolution authorising military intervention carries in the rest of the world. Such a resolution mobilises international opinion, forces concerted action and can mute much criticism. It can be sought without any weakening of the president's ability to act directly if vital national security interests are at stake; if achieved, it greatly strengthens America's hand.
The first Bush administration understood this in 1991, perhaps partly because George Herbert Walker Bush had once served as the American ambassador to the UN. Secretary of state James Baker and the American ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, built support through votes in the security council before Operation Desert Storm.
Today, unfortunately, Washington has a different attitude. Bypassing the security council is clearly tempting for an administration that, with the exception of secretary of state Colin Powell, shows little respect for the UN and has weakened it by unnecessary fights over secondary issues.
But a campaign against Saddam cannot be waged without allies, and the governments the US needs most are facing growing domestic opposition over Iraq. Last month, an adviser to Tony Blair told me that Washington "was giving Blair nothing" in return for his support, even as British domestic opposition to Blair's pro-US position was growing.
Some will argue that because security council resolutions dating back to 1991 have been violated by Saddam, there is already, in Baker's phrase, "sufficient legal authority" to sanction the use of force. This may have some merit in legal circles, but it has none in political or practical terms. As Baker noted, predicating action solely on existing resolutions will not be enough.
Washington policymakers have three core concerns when they discuss the security council route: first, that Iraq will agree to inspections and then cheat; second, that Russia or France will water down any resolution to the point of meaninglessness; third, that the resolution will not authorise regime change but only some lesser goal such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. On the first point, Russia, France and China are the key countries; any one of them could block security council action by using its veto. But if the Bush-Putin relationship is worth anything, Moscow should support a tough inspection regime; it has indicated readiness to do so in private. France will play its normal role as a difficult ally, but in the end it will not stop the concerted will of America and Britain. If London aggressively supports Washington, a resolution strong enough to lay the basis for action will be achievable. China will have its qualms, but it will not use its veto.
So the betting here is that effective American diplomacy - including the direct involvement of the president - would result in a resolution strong enough to lay the basis for immediate military action if Iraq violated it, as it has violated previous resolutions. If, however, such a resolution cannot be achieved, the administration, having made a best-faith effort in the security council, will be in a much stronger position to garner international and domestic support for action than if it had never tried at all.
On the issue of American objectives, this administration has (rightly) called for regime change. Unfortunately, few other nations in the world, and especially in the region, will openly subscribe to such a goal. Other nations will probably seek to limit any resolution to the issue of weapons of mass destruction. This, however, is less of a problem than it initially appears. If military action begins, it will soon become evident that it is impossible to eliminate the weapons without a change in regime.
Given that the Iraqi military is only one-third the size it was before the Gulf war, and American forces far stronger, the odds favour an American success. But no one can foresee clearly what will occur once a war starts. Will there be an assassination, a rebellion, a crumbling of the Iraqi military, a quick victory that pre-empts Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, a protracted struggle, or something worse? Whatever happens, once launched, the effort against Saddam cannot be stopped until its goal is achieved and the overwhelming power of the US has prevailed.
The president will have American support for the difficult decisions he will have to make, but it would strengthen his position greatly if he remembered the importance of using every non-military tool at his disposal to build international support - starting with the UN security council.
· Richard Holbrooke was US ambassador to the United Nations under President Clinton.
