6 May 2005Jamie GlazovFrontPageMagazine.com
As Turkey drifts toward Islamization, some serious questions arise: Is Turkey even our ally? Is Turkish accession to the EU in America's interests? Does the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which leads Turkey's government, threaten Turkish secularism? What policy should the Bush administration pursue toward Turkey? To discuss these and other issues with us today, Frontpage Symposium has assembled a distinguished panel of experts. Our guests today:
Soner Cagatay, a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Turkish Research Program. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals such as Middle East Quarterly, Middle Eastern Studies, and Nations and Nationalism;
Dr. Hans-Peter Raddatz, a scholar of Islamic Studies and author of four books, the recent being "Die Türkische Gefahr?" (The Turkish Danger?);
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and editor of the Middle East Quarterly. He was previously an Iran and Iraq staff advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His latest book, Eternal Iran: Chaos and Continuity (co-authored with Patrick Clawson) will be published in June 2005 by Palgrave;
and
Daniel Pipes,(www.DanielPipes.org) the director of the Middle East Forum and author of Miniatures (Transaction Publishers).
FP: Soner Cagaptay, Dr. Hans-Peter Raddatz, Michael Rubin and Daniel Pipes, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium. It is a pleasure to have you here.
Mr. Cagaptay, let's start with you. Let's begin with a few general questions first. What do you think are the main issues facing Turkey today? Where is Turkey headed? Where do you think Turkey should be headed?
Cagaptay: The major issue facing Turkey this year is successfully starting accession talks with the European Union (EU) in October. Last December, the EU established that pursuant to its recent political reforms, Turkey meets the EU's accession rules sufficiently to begin accession talks with the Union. Yet, hurdles, such as the unresolved Cyprus issue, which is a problem the EU has exacerbated, have raised doubts whether talks will being in October. Even if the talks begin on time, that does not mean Turkey is on the way to the EU. Negotiations will take at least a decade to complete; hence nobody is talking about Turkey's immediate EU accession. Yet, the talks are important to maintain Turkey's European/Western orientation. Besides, Turkey will benefit from the accession talks. Whether by bringing in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or increasing political instability, accession talks help candidate countries. All countries that have entered accession talks with the EU, I have in mind Spain in the 1980s and Poland in the 1990s for instance, have emerged from the talks with more prosperity and stability and this will happen also in the Turkish case. Having said this, one should not assume that the EU is the only game in town. Turkey needs to patch up its relationship with the U.S. (The EU may be an economic power, but the U.S. is a global power with unprecedented might). Besides, there is the issue of what Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is planning to do with the country's Middle Eastern neighbors, Iran and Syria. At a time when Ankara is improving its relations with these two countries, especially Syria, these two countries, especially Syria, are coming under increased international isolation and pressure. Will the AKP successfully balance these two developments?
FP: Dr. Raddatz?
Raddatz:I may elaborate a little on Mr. Cagaptay's major points, namely the accession talks and Turkey's relations aside from EU.
Needless to say that both are connected and in themselves multilaterally structured. It is true, of course, that the US is the world power as such and good relations with it are most important in the long run. On the other hand, however, the Turkish government will not be able to negotiate on reforms successfully without at least a basic understanding with domestic Islamic voters as well as with international Islamic partners, mainly in Saudi-Arabia.
It is continually neglected that AKP's first loyalty lies with its orthodox Islam version, its good relations to the Muslim Brotherhood and an extremely important project connected to both: an independent Turkish-Islamic settlement in Germany and at least 10 million Turks ready for emigration during the next decade. Aside from the so-called reforms which have not been too convincing yet, and Turkey's still difficult economic-financial situation, the upcoming accession talks have to be led very carefully. The EU public in general and the German one in particular have become quite sensitive as far as the credibility of Turkish officials is concerned.
As for your aspect of Turkish secularism being jeopardized, one may wonder indeed in how far this country has been secularized at all. The doubts are twofold: Turks are ethnic nationals in the first place. There may be negotiable room in Islamic questions but there is none as far as Turkey's dominant ethnical position is concerned. The connection between state an religion has always been very close, even through the Kemalist period.
Only recently Mr. Erdogan - an Islamist - stressed that he would "pursue the Kurds into Argentina", should they continue dreaming of their own state. Moreover, it is a Turkish specialty to keep governmental affairs inside a traditional oligarchy of political parties, big corporations, real-estate tycoons, powerful bureaucrats and leading representatives of Islam. So far, the leadership of egalitarian interests has merely shifted from Kemalists to Islamists without jeopardizing the oligarchic understanding. For the time being, secularism and democratic institutions in the Western meaning will certainly stay very weak. Only since recently the EU officials have started to grasp the situation beyond their usual "win-win"-horizon, let alone the current German government which is running a distinct pro-Islamic if not outright Islamist policy.
Rubin: Turkey is a friend. The question is how deep the friendship is. Is Turkey a friend like Canada, Britain, and Israel are friends? Or is Turkey a friend like Egypt and Tunisia are friends? No doubt our relationship has taken a hit. While both sides can point to specific grievances, I'm not sure I believe anymore that the AKP really wants the special relationship to continue. If unintentional, Foreign Minister Gul's criticism of the Bush administration in the weeks before the U.S. Presidential election was a sign of professional incompetence. If intentional, then Gul was interfering in our elections in a manner that Turkey would never tolerate itself. It seems that the AKP sometimes sees relations as a zero-sum game: Want to improve relations with the EU? Kick the US. Have rapprochement with Syria? Undermine the Lebanese democracy movement. Develop business ties to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia? Downgrade the partnership with Israel.
No one in the U.S. government has ever doubted Turkey's independence and its democracy. But policy is best based on principles rather than shaped by a desire to react against other states' policies. We know that Turkey stands for democracy and secularism at home, but it is unclear what Turkish foreign policy stands for. What troubles me most, is that so many recent Turkish actions under cut Turkey's own war against terrorism and separatism.
Pipes: Turkey has been a friend; but I have grave doubts about its future status. Let me explain.
I see Turkey as a uniquely pliable country. What Atatürk accomplished, changing so much of the country in fifteen brief years, 1923-38, is a unique development (with the partial exception of the Meiji restoration leaders a half-century earlier). He wrenched the country from one way of life and pushed it toward another, with considerable effect.
I see Recep Tayyip Erdo?an as the anti-Atatürk. He is young enough, clever enough, and popular enough to stay in power as long or longer than Atatürk and step-by-step, almost imperceptively, to undo the entire Atatürk revolution. We have already seen the fruits of this in his two and a half-years in power: the refusal to help the American-led coalition eliminate the noxious Saddam Hussein regime, Mein Kampf becoming a bestseller, and the Turkish public having among the most anti-Bush attitudes of any population in the world.
I do not know where this transformation will end, but if things go as they have the past few years, I expect Turkey before long to be more in the "foe" category, along with Saudi Arabia, than the "friend" one.
FP: Mr. Cagaptay, feel free to respond to what you feel needs a rejoinder in terms of what the rest of the panel has said. But kindly include your view on the developments Dr. Pipes has referred to.
Cagaptay: First, let me take on some of Dr. Raddatz's points: having doubts on Turkey's secularism seems an uniformed way of looking at Turkish politics. Turkish secularism is modeled after French laicite --the founders of the Turkish republic found much inspiration in the modern French state-- offering citizens freedom from religion. Second, state-religion relations in Turkey are rooted in the Ottoman tradition which basically foresaw subjecting religion to state authority. The end product is Turkish secularism which Dr. Raddatz doubts. You may argue that this is not secular in the way Germany is, but then when you look around Europe, you see that there are almost as many models of secularism as there are states. For instance, the Queen of England is the head of the Church of England, the Dutch government funds religious education, the Nordic Countries have official state religions, and in Germany, citizens pay a "church tax." None of that is the case in Turkey and yet we are not suggesting that Germany or these other countries are not secular. The ultimate question is, does Turkey separate religion and government? Yes, it does. How Turkey does this is a product of its unique history just as British secularism is a product of British history.Second, the fear of massive migration of Anatolian peasants to Germany. Totally, unfounded. Why? Capital moves faster than labor. There were similar fears before Spain joined the EU that millions of poor Andalucian peasants would flood France and Germany. Well this did not happen. Before, poor Spanish peasants could pack up, and move to Germany and rest of Europe, European capital flooded Spain, creating jobs and opportunities and tying the Spanish peasants to their country. This will happen also in the case of (likely) Turkish accession to the EU.In response to Mr. Pipes' doubts about Turkey's system coming undone in an anti-Ataturk spree, I believe secularism is strong enough in Turkey that it cannot be undone. After all Turkey has eighty years of that (and more than 50 years of multi-party democracy). However, something else seems to be under strain is the country: Turkey's ability to have good, healthy relations with the Western world. This is one of the three characteristics that, together with secularism and democracy, distinguishes Turkey from all other Muslim countries. The ripple effects of the Iraq War, which has angered literally every Turk, secular Turks who are the majority constituency in the country, are as upset with the US as are Islamists, has caused a deterioration in US-Turkish relations. The concomitant rise of the AKP has widened the spectrum of acceptable political discourse. When you add the two factors together, you get pent up resentment against US in the Middle East, which are not tampered at all. This is where Turkey's very fragmented, secular elite needs to assert itself and take ownership of the relationship with the US.
Raddatz: Our discussion so far has shown that there are widely differing concepts of what secularism basically means. Mr. Cagaptay seems of the opinion that secularism comes into existence by an administrational act. The mere fact that Turkey has separated state and religion officially, has not really changed the attitude towards religiously motivated customs. The recent extremely violent police action against a demonstration of women in Istanbul did not look very secular. Mr. Pipes has made a similar point. As long as we have to register a Turkish government led by orthodox Islam rules we may doubt a dominant democratic motive. Unfortunately, Mr. Cagaptay did not take up my indication towards the old antagonism between nationalists and Islamists which has hampered constructive policies since the last army intervention back in 1980.
The ongoing nation-wide discussion of the so-called "Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis" shows how seriously the Turks themselves take their division between old traditions and the necessities of a new democratic order. Also Mr. Rubin takes the matter too lightly if he thinks that the Turkish democracy is already a complete affair. If he knew about the pressure on liberal journalists as well as the everyday circumstances in Anatolia with arbitrary police action still going on he would think differently.
When we concur on secularism as a common agreement on religion being excluded from political decision making in its practical sense, Turkey has certainly started to move away from it since the Islamist takeover in 2002. This has had some impact on Germany as well. Contrary to France and England we have a different approach here towards religion in general and the Middle East in particular. It is not a short-term zeitgeist indication when the green-left government supports Mr. Erdogan where it can. There is a serious congruence among the two in anti-US and anti-Israel attitudes. I said it before and I repeat it again: the German government is running a distinct pro-Islamic policy which on the European scale is starting to stand out as some sort of ideological and unprofessional encumbrance. In other words: as far as secularism is concerned Germany is becoming a political problem herself. Meanwhile our politicians lack the necessary objectivity and distance they need to judge what we are talking about here. For them Turkey is simply a friend regardless of what happens.
The lack of competence has very important consequences for the migration situation as such. Mr. Cagaptay is right about capital flowing faster than people which is the major reason why our migration management will come under growing scrutiny. In the global era we certainly cannot afford financing the domestic Turkish demographic surplus migrating into Europe and Germany. You would not blame an entrepreneur for "fears" when he closes a deficitary business segment. Globalization means competition for markets and competition means innovative people. So far Germany has been the only immigration country in the world who preferred illiterate to educated people. Needless to say that meanwhile one third of them live on welfare. The palliative language of "cultural enrichment" and other slogans does not really convince any longer.
The more serious result of this kind of selection is the very unsecular accumulation of Islamist led ghettos in the big cities where German law has stopped being applied. You can observe demonstrations of Islamist organizations in Berlin and elsewhere burning the US flag and calling Jews "animals" and worse while at least one member of the German parliament is marching with them. Meanwhile in the official language the approx.100 Muslim women murdered annually are called cases of "honour murders" which may show a somewhat unsecular sympathy with Muslim motivations. By the same time Erdogan and his Foreign Minister are pushing their radical mosque organization Milli Görüsh (National Vision) with big money indeed. Wherever necessary they combine it with their "secular" religion ministry (diyanet) in order to smooth the local German environment. Mind you, I do not blame the Turks for taking advantage of this very favourable situation, I want to direct your kind attention to the very fact that German policies have a severe problem with democratic rules of checks and balances. The majority interest is simply not on their agenda. When some prosecutors are currently looking into our Foreign Minister's visa affair of uncontrolled immigration of at least 4 million people as well as his possible involvement in perjury cases attached you might stop talking about "fears".
Rubin: It would be a mistake to suggest that, because Turkey separates religion and government, that there is not a threat to Turkish secularism. The very fact that we need to debate the AKP's intentions suggests there is. The two basic questions are whether the AKP really respects traditional Turkish values and whether Turkish secularism is strong enough to withstand the AKP agenda. The answers to these questions will determine to what degree Turkey will remain a friend to the West's democracies.
The AKP's commitment to secularism is unclear. In May 2004, Erdogan pushed an education bill which aimed to ease entry of religious school graduates into Turkey's university system, basically allowing them to bypass secular state schools. While Erdogan eventually withdrew the bill, its impact would have been enormous. If religious school graduates can enter regular universities, then they can win government jobs and yet never have had a secular, technocratic education. There are other troubling signs. There is nothing wrong with wearing head covering as an expression of religious identity, but not all head coverings are the same. That Erdogan's wife and daughter where a style much closer to that promoted by Saudi Arabia rather than that traditionally worn in Turkish conservative circles is worrying. So too is Erdogan's choice of advisors. The U.S. Department of Treasury has frozen the assets of Yasin al-Qadi because of links to al-Qaeda. The Turkish newspaper Hürriyet has reported that Erdogan's closest advisor Cuneyd Zapsu was a business partner of al-Qadi. Erdogan's continued reliance on Zaps
