1 October 2006David E. Sanger
That is what is underway now with Bob Woodward’s latest book, “State of Denial,” an unflattering portrait of an administration riven by discord over the Iraq war.
Mr. Woodward’s narrative is unsurprising to anyone who has closely followed the Bush administration: the first-term loyalty of aides devolved into infighting as soon as no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. Then the intramural squabbling turned into public protestations of “if-only-they-had-listened-to-me.”
For its part, the White House did deny that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld have a private war of their own underway. But what about another disclosure that Andrew H. Card, the former White House chief of staff, twice suggested booting Mr. Rumsfeld? Mr. Card, in an interview, acknowledged the recommendation but said it came in the context of broader discussions of cabinet changes.
And what about the officials in the Bush administration who were ignored when they called for an increase in the number of troops in Iraq? Among them were Robert D. Blackwill, the Iraq coordinator at the White House, and L. Paul Bremer III, the senior American overseeing the Iraq occupation. But none, said Tony Snow, the press secretary, were in the “chain of command,” meaning that they were not generals asking for more troops.
Did Mr. Bush listen only to his generals? Of course not, said the White House.
So what happened to all those recommendations? No one is willing to say.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/weekinreview/01basicA.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin
